

15 August 1963

SUBJECT: Director of Central Intelligence
TO: Deputy Director (Intelligence)
FROM: Pakistan's Grievances Against the
 US Government

25X1

2. At the heart of the problem is the well known fact that the primary concerns of the US and Pakistan in the area are quite different. To Pakistan the primary and immediate threat to its national interests comes from India. Pakistan measures the value of its friends, alliances, and its own courses of action in terms of the contribution made with respect to "security" against India. This is not to say that Pakistan fails to recognize the potential threat to Pakistan posed by China or the USSR or the need for concerted free world action to contain Communist pressures on a broad front. However, these threats are viewed as secondary and more remote than the threat from India. The Pakistanis claim that the United States does not appreciate the serious nature of the Indian threat. In their frustration over this situation, Ayub and other senior officials often make the following points about the state of our alliance relationship:

a. The CENTO and SEATO defense pacts are too limited in scope. They are directed against Communist aggression only and afford no protection to member countries against the "real" threat from regional non-Communist enemies. Comment: The differing motivations of the US and Pakistan, were tacitly recognized and accepted by both parties when the agreements were signed.

Pakistani preoccupation with India as a military threat has now grown to the point where the larger purposes of the pact have little meaning or value in Pakistani minds.

b. The bilateral security guarantees against an Indian attack which the US has given Pakistan cannot be relied on, because the responsibility for aggression cannot always be clearly fixed, and because the US could not--perhaps would not--field an adequate force rapidly enough to prevent the Indian Army from over-running Pakistan. Comment: This is a valid argument if one assumes the likelihood of Indian aggression, although it probably under-estimates Western counteraction and other international restraints against such action.

c. US participation in CENTO--and to a lesser extent SEATO--is half-hearted. The command structure and extent of military planning is too limited to be effective. Western members are guilty of considerable footdragging on proposals made by the regional members for closer collaboration. Comment: There often seems to be good grounds for these charges, particularly with respect to the US role in CENTO.

d. The US frequently fails to carry out its obligation to consult in advance of major moves affecting Pakistan. Comment: While there have been extensive efforts over the years to keep the Pakistanis advised and to solicit their views, there have also been major lapses--some inadvertent--during the past year. Our decisions on emergency military aid to India last fall are a case in point.

e. The US often adopts an impartial position on regional issues involving one of its allies and an uncommitted nation. That is the point of being committed to the West if one's neutralist adversaries get equal--at times even preferential--treatment from the US. The US gives no preference to the interests of its proven friends. Comment: Pakistanis often tend to view the alliance as a commercial transaction wherein Pakistan's national cooperation was traded for US political

-3-

support (in addition to considerable quantities of military equipment). Seen from this viewpoint, the charge that we have defaulted our "moral" obligation may seem reasonable. As we see it, the Pakistanis have been amply repaid in material terms for their commitment and neither side should assume that the other's every action is to be measured solely in terms of the interests of its ally.

3. Pakistani officials have long measured the quantity and quality of US aid with the same yardstick. For example:

a. The Indians, despite their neutralist position, get more aid from the West than Pakistan does. Comment: This is true only in absolute terms. Pakistan receives about one and a half times as much as India on a per capita basis.

b. India now is receiving substantial arms aid from the West, while maintaining its nonaligned position between the Free World and the Bloc. Comment: The amount of aid to India is far less than most Pakistanis assume it to be. Pakistan's extensive military aid has been provided on a grant basis; India is "purchasing" its equipment, although the softness of the terms makes these deals tantamount to grants. India remains "nonaligned" in a formal sense but has accepted close associations with the West as part of its military buildup since last fall.

c. The rate of deliveries under Pakistan's military aid program in recent years has been extremely slow. Comment: There was a substantial slowdown in deliveries until early this year, when a special effort resulted in a stepped up pace. The slowdown was in part, a deliberate US effort to limit the Pakistan-Indian arms race and to reduce tensions.

d. The International Bank, prompted by the US has reneged on its agreement under the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 to construct the Tarbela dam on the Indus River. Comment: There is an apparently honest disagreement as to the extent we committed ourselves

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040019-2

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2004/12/01 : CIA-RDP79T00429A001300040019-2